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Patent Law: Attorney-Client Privilege in Patent
Litigation: Did the Federal Circuit Go Far Enough with
In re Spalding Sports Worldwide?
L Introduction
One of the few ways to avoid the wide reach of modem discovery is a
claim of attorney-client privilege. The Federal Circuit recently resolved a legal
dispute that had split federal district courts for several decades regarding the
application of the privilege in patent litigation.' Some circuits followed the
theory that patent attorneys act as mere conduits to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office.' Because their clients had no expectation of confiden-
tiality, the privilege did not protect such communications? Other circuits
reasoned that patent attorneys are more than mere conduits, and that courts
should accord communications from client to patent attorney the same protec-
tion as any other legal communication." In In ie Spalding Sports Worldwide,
Inc.,' the Federal Circuit held that communications between client and patent
attorney are privileged, even if they contain mostly technical data, as long as
the client made the communication for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.6
The court also ruled on several other important issues, including: (1) when the
precedent of the Federal Circuit applies over the precedent of the circuit where
the case originated; (2) when to invoke the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege; and (3) when the extraordinary remedy of a writ of
mandamus is proper to contest a discovery order.
In Part II, this note briefly explains the role of the relatively new Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In Part III, this note examines the history of
the attorney-client privilege, with a more detailed emphasis on the history of
the application of the privilege to patent attorneys. Part IV explains the
holding of Spalding. Part V then demon'strates that the Federal Circuit, in
resolving a split of authority, chose the correct path in extending the privilege
to most legal communications between client and patent attorney. However,
Part V also argues that the court should have followed a developing line of
I. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2. See, e.g., Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936 (CL CI. 1980).
5. 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
6. Id. at 806.
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case law that suggests that all communications between client and patent
attorney are presumptively privileged, including communications conveying
purely technical information. In Part VI, the note concludes by first examining
several relevant holdings since Spalding, and next suggesting to patent
practitioners which communications are now privileged and how to properly
maintain the privilege. An understanding of the Federal Circuit, which decides
patent case appeals, as well as an understanding of the history of the patent
attomey-client privilege is vital to a full appreciation of Spalding.
II. The Federal Circuit
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to solidify the varying lines of
patent law that were developing among the district courts The Federal Court
Improvement Act of 1982 sought "'to reduce the widespread lack of
uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the administration of
patent law"' by creating the Federal Circuit to hear appeals and set binding
precedent in patent cases.' The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1295, covers an appeal of any district court decision with
jurisdiction based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which encompas-
ses patents, trademarks, copyrights, and any pendant unfair business practice
claims.' The general jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit has been to apply
its own substantive law to patent issues and the appropriate regional circuit
law to nonpatent issues."' A discussion of the reasons for the existence of the
Federal Circuit is germane to an examination of Spalding, because the holding
of Spalding purported to settle the exact sort of confusing split of authority
Congress attempted to combat when it created the Federal Circuit." Indeed,
7. According to the legislative history, the purpose of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, was to create
a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law. Based
on the evidence it had compiled, the Hruska Commission singled out patent law
as an area in which the application of the law to the facts of the case often
produces different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar
cases. Furthermore, in a Commission survey of practitioners, the patent bar
indicated that the uncertainty created by the lack of a national law precedent
was a significant problem ....
S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (footnote omitted), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15.
8. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981)). Panduit includes an extensive discussion of
the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit.
9. Id. at 1573.
10. Id.




the scope of the attorney-client privilege, when applied to patent attorneys, had
split district courts and confused practitioners for many years.,
IlL. The Patent Attorney-Client Privilege
The complexity involved in obtaining and protecting a patent is difficult to
overstate. As early as 1889, Justice Brown of the U.S. Supreme Court
observed, "The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the
invention be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal
instruments to draw with accuracy."'" Judge Learned Hand remarked that the
issue of whether an invention is patentable "is as fugitive, impalpable,
wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal
concepts."'" "The complexity involved in patent applications, combined with
the myriad of complicated patent statutes and regulations, motivates most
inventors to use patent attorneys to obtain patents from the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ....'"' The use of attorneys to obtain patents
inevitably raises questions regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege
available between patent attorney and client.
In determining whether the privilege applies, a court will turn to either Dean
Wigmore's time-honored test'" or the similar test established by Judge
12. Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
13. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). Judge Hand went
on to comment eloquently on the issues of patentability and patent infringement:
Courts never tire, or at least in earlier times they never did, of expatiating upon
the freshness of insight which observes a little, but fruitful, change which had
theretofore escaped detection by those engaged in the field. When all is said,
we are called upon imaginatively to project this act of discovery against a
hypostatized average practitioner, acquainted with all that has been published
and all that has been publicly sold. If there be an issue more troublesome, or
more apt for litigation than this, we are not aware of it.
Id.
14. James Y. Go, Comment, Patent Attorneys and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 611,613 (1995) (footnote omitted) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000)
and 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.825 (2001) as examples of "complicated patent statutes and
regulations").
15. Wigmore sets out the elements of attorney-client privilege as:
(I) Where legal advice of any kind is sought;
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such;
(3) the communication relating to that purpose;
(4) made in confidence;
(5) by the client;
(6) are at his instance permanently protected;
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor;
(8) except the protection be waived.
20021
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Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.6 Interestingly,
the exceedingly popular United Shoe test arose out of a patent dispute." The
United Shoe court noted that patent department employees are "comparable to
the employees with legal training who serve in the mortgage or trust
departments of a bank" and that "[g]rist which comes to their mill has a
higher percentage of business content than legal content."'" The United Shoe
court flatly denied patent attorneys the attorney-client privilege, stating that the
relationship between an attorney in the patent department and the corporation
is not that of attorney and client, but rather that of a lawyer who shares an
office with a "so-called" client and gives him principally business, but only
incidentally legal, advice. 9
Such a ruling aligned well with mid-twentieth century precedent regard-
ing patent attorney claims of privilege. In 1954, in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Radio Corp. of America, " the court held that "[e]ssentially, [patent]
attorneys.. . are engaged in a type of nonlegal work to which the attorney-
client privilege . .. [does] not attach."'" "[E]ven the general application
of patent law to developments of their companies and competitors" was not
primarily a legal activity according to the Zenith court.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
16. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). The court set out the following elements:
(I) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (1) an opinion of law or (2) legal services
or (3) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b)
not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59. For the assertion that a court will follow one of the two tests, see PATENT
LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 233 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds.,
2000) [hereinafter PATENT HANDBOOK].
17. See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 361.
20. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
21. Id. at 793.
22. Id. at 794. The holding in context reads:
[Patent attorneys] do not "act as lawyers" when not primarily engaged in legal
activities; when largely concerned with technical aspects of a business or
engineering character, or competitive considerations in their companies' constant
race for patent proficiency, or the scope of public patents, or even the general
application of patent law to developments of their companies and competitors;




The situation finally came to a head in 1963, when the United States
Supreme Court, in Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar," stated that it did
"not question the determination that the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications for others constitutes the practice of law." 4 In Sperry, the
Court noted that such conduct requires the practitioner to apply statutory
criteria when making an initial patentability determination for a client, as well
as to overcome the extreme difficulty of drafting the claims and the
specifications, with legal accuracy." Now that the Supreme Court had settled
the issue of whether patent attorneys are engaged in the practice of law, a new
battle arose. The controversy focused on which communications between
patent attorney and client received the attorney-client privilege, and two
distinct lines of cases emerged.
A. The Jack Winter Line of Cases
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, the patent applicant and his
attorney must disclose to the PTO anything material to the patentability of the
invention." In Jack Winter, Inc. v Koratron Co.," the District Court for the
inventor's information, prior art, or legal tests for invention and novelty; when
drafting or comparing patent specifications and claims; when preparing the
application for letters patent or amendments thereto and prosecuting same in the
Patent Office; when handling interference proceedings in the Patent Office
concerning patent applications.
Id.
23. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). This case arose on appeal from a Florida Supreme Court
decision holding that agents licensed to practice before the PTO could not practice in Florida.
See Florida ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962). Two groups of
individuals may represent others before the PTO in patent prosecution. Under 37 C.F.R. §
10.6(a) (2001), technically qualified attorneys may practice, and under 37 C.F.R. § 10.6(b)
(2001), technically qualified nonlawyers (patent agents) may practice. The Florida Supreme
Court enjoined patent agents from practicing in the state because it determined that patent
prosecution was the practice of law, and patent agents were not members of the Florida Bar.
Sperry, 140 So. 2d at 596.
24. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 383. Because the Supreme Court's holding focused on the
Supremacy Clause, this statement forced states to allow patent agents to practice within their
borders. Id. at 384-85.
25. Id.
26. Section 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
27. 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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Northern District of California explained that, on the question of disclosure,
case law clearly called for a bona fide, full disclosure to the PTO.' The
court observed that an application for a patent must include a good faith
disclosure of sufficient factual information to enable one skilled in the art to
make and practice the invention. 9 The court therefore reasoned that
the attorney exercises no discretion as to what portion of infor-
mation [relevant to patentability passed from client to attorney]
must be relayed to the Patent Office. He must turn all such
information over in full . . . and hence with respect to such
material he acts as a conduit between his client and the Patent
Office."
The court held that because the client does not expect the information to
remain confidential, the attorney-client privilege does not protect such
communication?'
The Jack Winter line of cases 3 proceeds on the assumption that the client
cannot intend the patent attorney to hold the information in confidence for
three reasons. First, the communication consists mainly of technical
28. Id. In Jack Winter, a patent attorney refused to answer certain questions asked of
him at his deposition. The attorney refused to answer questions that sought to elicit the
names of persons who gave him information and samples for the purposes of preparing the
patent application, the substance of the information imparted, his responses to persons
consulting him with respect to the application, and his knowledge of the processes described
in the application. Id. at 227.
29. Id. at 228.
30. Id.; see also BioRad Lab. v. Pharmacia, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 116 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
Quantum Corp. v. W. Digital Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Hercules
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 39
(D. Md. 1974).
31. Jack Winter, 50 F.R.D. at 228.
32. See, e.g., Howes v. Med. Components Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (advocating conduit theory for information used only to prepare a patent application);
Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 716 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding
technical material related to final patent and studies of prior art not privileged); Sneider v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 5 (E.D. I11. 1980) (holding that allowing privilege to
apply would allow patent attorneys to act as conduits to avoid discovery); Ashland Oil, Inc.
v. Delta Oil Prods. Corp., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 151 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (advocating conduit
theory); Choat v. Rome Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (holding documents
relating to preparation and filing of patent applications not privileged); Hercules Inc., 434
F. Supp. at 147 (D. Del. 1977) (holding that technical information used in completing a
patent application not privileged); Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1167 (same); Burlington




information." Second, the client wants a patent application prepared and
presented to the PTO.' Third, the PTO may ultimately allow the application
to issue as a patent, which is available to the public." Therefore, the client
cannot intend that the information be held in confidence."
Jack Winter stands for the proposition that a patent attorney, in utilizing
technical information to advise clients on patentability and to write patent
applications, acts not as an attorney, but as a technician." The Jack Winter
court clarified itself one year later, holding that the attorney-client privilege
protects documents that contain considerable technical information, but which
are primarily concerned with giving legal guidance. Nevertheless, Jack
Winter is usually cited as the leading case for the "conduit" theory."'
B. The Knogo Line of Cases
In Knogo Corp. v. United States,' the Court of Claims' recognized that
"[s]ome of the most difficult discovery questions presented in patent litigation
relate to the assertion of attorney-client privilege with respect to com-
munications containing primarily or exclusively technical information."' 2 The
Court of Claims addressed the issue of attorney-client privilege according to
Judge Wyzanski's test established in United Shoe."3 Although Knogo cited
authority for its split from Jack Winter " the court, in reality, created new
33. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also I ETHAN HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS §
5.01[4], at 5-29 (2000).
37. HORWITZ, supra note 36, § 5.01[4], at 5-29 to 5-30.
38. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
39. See, e.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 806 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2000); HORWITZ, supra note 36, § 5.01 [4], at 5-29 (recognizing that Jack Winter is represen-
tative of cases supporting conduit theory); PATENT HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 247 (stating
that Jack Winter stands for the proposition that the patent attorney acts merely as a conduit
between the client and the PTO).
40. 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
41. The Court of Claims is the predecessor to the Federal Circuit. See South Corp. v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (1982). In South Corp., the Federal Circuit also adopted
the holdings of the Court of Claims as precedent. Id.
42. Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 939. Knogo involved a ruling on a motion to compel
production of several documents, including letters from patent attorney to client and
memoranda of experts submitted to the attorney to aid in assessing the invention's
patentability and aid in obtaining a patent. Id, at 938-39.
43. Id. at 938; see also supra note 16.
44. See Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 940 (citing Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978)).
2002]
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precedent.4' After carefully considering the Jack Winter line of cases, the
court noted that
a distinction can be made between the duty to disclose how to
make and use the invention and the mere funneling of technical
information from the client through the attorney to the Patent
Office. The former is the job of a patent attorney, while the latter
is an inaccurate, and uninformed characterization of the patent
attorney's role in the preparation and prosecution of a patent
application."
The Knogo court observed that the attorney-client privilege only protects
communication between the attorney and client, not the technical information
contained in the communication ' The court explained, "[T]he client cannot
assert the privilege if asked how the invention works, but he can assert the
privilege if he is asked to recount what he told his attorney concerning how
the invention works."" The court also likened the patent application process
to the preparation of a civil complaint; the possibility of eventual public
disclosure of the information does not waive the privilege. 9
A variation on the Knogo theme arose in 1992. In Advanced Cardiovas-
cular Systems v. C.R. Bard, Inc.," the court reasoned that inventors and their
patent lawyers engage in substantial private dialogue as part of the process of
shaping and focusing a patent application. Furthermore, the court found it
reasonable to expect those conversations to remain privileged.52 Therefore,
the court ruled that communications, even entirely technical communications,
from inventor to patent attorney are presumptively privileged." The court
would only consider ordering disclosure of such communications on a "very
compelling showing" that the inventor expected the patent attorney merely to
45. Natta seemingly only stood for the propositions that discovery rules apply to patent
litigation, see Natta, 392 F.2d at 690, and that an automatic waiver of attorney-client
privilege does not occur when a patent controversy is presented, see idU at 692. Ampicillin
is somewhat more helpful in that it held that information need not be known only to the
client to be privileged, see Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 389, but the case never specifically
discussed technical information. Natta came down before Jack Winter, and Ampicillin never
recognized a split of authority or even cited Jack Winter.
46, Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 940.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 941 (citing Natta, 392 F.2d at 692).
50. 144 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Cal. 1992).






pass on the communication to the PTM without changes or editing. ' In many
ways, this opinion departed significantly even from the Knogo line of
reasoning." This note examines Advanced Cardiovascular and its progeny
extensively in Part V (the analysis of Spalding), arguing that the Federal
Circuit should have adopted the Advanced Cardiovascular variation on
Knogo.
6
C. Confusion Caused by the Split of Authority
A majority of circuits eventually followed Knogo, including the First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits." Scholars, however, still recog-
nized a clear split of authority." As a result, the amount of protection
accorded to a communication between client and patent attorney varied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.' Indeed, many courts noted that "[p]atent
attorneys... prosecute[d] patent applications and [wrote] opinion letters with
the knowledge that the attorney-client privilege ... might not apply."" The
authors of the 2000 edition of the Patent Litigation Strategies Handbook
wondered which school of thought the Federal Circuit would follow if ever
presented with the issue."' Shortly after Spalding, one article asserted that
patent attorneys had been keenly aware that whether the privilege applied had
depended on where the case was and, in some cases, the identity of the
presiding judge.62
McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble,"3 in which a Colorado federal
district court followed the Jack Winter line of cases, validated many of the
concerns noted above." It would have seemed logical for a district court in
the Tenth Circuit to follow the Knogo line because the Tenth Circuit laid part
of the foundation for Knogo in Natta v. Hogan.' However, Colorado Federal
District Judge William E. Doyle authored the opinion in Jack Winter while
54. Md
55. For the "presumption of privilege" and "submitted without editing to the PTO"
sections of the holding, the court did not cite any authority. Id.
56. See infra Part V.B.
57. See PATENT HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 247 & n.101.
58. See Go, supra note 14, at 625-26 (noting that a clear division of authority existed).
59. Id. at 626.
60. a at 611.
61. See PATENT HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 248 (asserting that there was a "good
chance" the Federal Circuit would follow the Knogo line of cases).
62. William M. Atkinson & Sandra L. Boscia, Attorney-Client Privilege, NAT'L L.,
Aug. 7, 2000, at B8.
63. 136 F.R.D. 666 (D. Colo. 1991).
64. i at 670.
65. 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); see also supra note 44-45 and accompanying text.
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sitting by designation in the Northern District of California." While the
McNeil court found that it was not bound by Judge Doyle's precedent, the
court nevertheless found Judge Doyle's reasoning to be sound. Surprisingly,
the McNeil court allowed the deposition of a patent attorney to encompass
advice given during the creation of the patent application." Such a con-
voluted twist of events demonstrates the confusion that confronted patent
attorneys and patent applicants prior to Spalding.'
IV. The Holding of In re Spalding Sports Worldwide
Spalding made its way to the Federal Circuit by way of a petition for a writ
of mandamus.' Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc. (Spalding) contested a
discovery order from a United States Magistrate Judge from the District of
Massachusetts requiring Spalding to produce a document described as an
invention record.' Invention records are records submitted by inventors to
the corporate patent department to disclose that the invention has been made
and is ready for the patenting process. Invention records often include the
names of the inventors, a description and scope of the invention, the closest
prior art, the first dates of conception and disclosure to others, and the dates
of publication. 3 The magistrate judge, in granting a motion to compel, held
66. McNeil, 136 F.R.D. at 670.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 671.
69. For example, in a 2000 patent treatise, the authors noted that, in light of McNeil, the
Tenth Circuit debatably followed Jack Winter. PATENT HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 247.
Such a conclusion seems to fly in the face of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Natta v. Hogan.
See supra note 45.
70. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 802 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
71. Id. The patent at issue was United States Patent No. 5,310,178, for a basketball with
a polyurethane cover. Id. Spalding Sports had sued Wilson Sporting Goods for patent
infringement. Id. at 802 n. 1.
72. Id. at 802 n.2.
73. Id. According to one article, invention records might contain much more. See
Robert Crouse, Invention Record May Be Protected, TRIANGLE BUS. J., July 28, 2000, at 18.
Crouse recognized that an invention record is crucial in a case of patent litigation, and courts
have traditionally not allowed the attorney-client privilege to protect such records. ld. The
invention record may contain evidence that contradicts positions of the patent holder at trial.
Specifically, it might include evidence of prior art not presented to the PTO, which would
weigh heavily in a charge of inequitable conduct. i. Moreover, Crouse stresses that the
invention record may provide a window on the mental state of the inventor at the time of the
invention. Id. The inventor may have expressed concerns that the invention was obvious or
anticipated by prior art. Id. This does not necessarily evidence bad faith on the part of the
patent applicant because the PTO, not the applicant, ultimately judges patentability, but such




that (1) the invention record was not privileged; and (2) even if privileged,
Wilson's prima facie showing of inequitable conduct abrogated the attorney-
client privilege.' In holding that the invention record was not privileged, the
magistrate judge noted that the invention record appeared to be primarily
technical, rather than legal in nature, thus adopting the "mere conduit"
theory." The district court denied reconsideration of the order, deciding that
the magistrate's findings were neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law."
In response to the holding, Spalding petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ
of mandamus directing the district judge to vacate the magistrate's order to
produce the invention record."
The Federal Circuit's opinion, authored by Judge Lourie, divided the appeal
into four parts. The Federal Circuit first determined that the law of the Federal
Circuit, rather than that of the First Circuit, 7 controlled.' Next, the Federal
Circuit found that mandamus was indeed an appropriate remedy to contest the
discovery order." Third, the court found that the attorney-client privilege
applied to the invention record." Finally, the court found that the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege did not apply and thus granted the
petition for a writ of mandamus,' ordering Judge Ponsor to vacate the
magistrate's order."3
A. The Federal Circuit Applies Its Own Law to Attorney-Client Privilege
Issues
When reviewing district court judgments, the Federal Circuit usually applies
the law of the circuit in which the district court sits to nonpatent issues.
74. Spalding & Evenflo Cos. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 97-30275-MAP, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21966, at **5-10 (D. Mass. June 9, 1999). Spalding & Evenflo changed its
name to Spalding Sports Worldwide effective September 1, 1998.
75. Id. at *6. Specifically, the magistrate judge held that
it does not appear that Spalding's legal department addressed the product's
patentability at a patent committee meeting or took any action on the infor-
mation contained in the document itself. For all the court knows, the document
was meant primarily as an aid in completing the patent application rendering
the attorney a mere "conduit" to the patent office.
Id. (emphasis added).
76. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 802.
77. Id. at 803.
78. The District of Massachusetts, where the case originated, is in the First Circuit.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 804-05.
81. Id. at 806.
82. Id. at 808.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 803.
2002]
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The court decides questions of substantive patent law, however, under the law
of the Federal Circuit.' Moreover,
a procedural issue that is not itself a substantive patent law issue
is nonetheless governed by Federal Circuit law if the issue pertains
to patent law, if it bears an essential relationship to matters
committed to [the court's] exclusive" [jurisdiction] by statute, or if
it clearly implicates the jurisprudential responsibilities of [the] court
in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction."
The Spalding opinion applied Federal Circuit law to the decision of whether
particular materials are discoverable in patent cases because those materials
relate to a substantive issue of patent law." Making a parallel argument, the
court reasoned that the question of the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege to an invention record bears on the issue of inequitable conduct.u
The court found that the question of inequitable conduct implicated substan-
tive patent law." The Federal Circuit therefore held that its own law applies
to questions of attorney-client privilege with respect to communications made
in pursuit of patents or patent litigation.9' The court then distinguished a case
in which it had applied Seventh Circuit law to a question of attorney-client
privilege in a licensing dispute.9 The court observed that an invention record
is unique to patent law because it relates to inventions submitted for the
85. Id.
86. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Midwest Indus. v. Karavan, 175 F.3d
1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant part)).
87. Id. (citing Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1359; Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc.,
813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("(A] determination of relevance implicates the
substantive law of patent validity and infringement.")).
88. Id. at 803-04.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 804. The Spalding court mentioned that Wilson supported the application of
First Circuit law, while Spalding proposed the application of Federal Circuit law. Id. at 803.
Wilson likely supported the application of First Circuit law because the First Circuit had
adopted a narrow view of the attorney-client privilege, see, e.g., Unites States v. Mass. Inst.
of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684-85 (Ist Cir. 1997) ("The familiar platitude is that the privilege
is narrowly confined because it hinders the courts in the search for truth."), while the Federal
Circuit had yet to rule on the issue. Spalding did not necessarily know how the Federal
Circuit would hold with respect to attorney-client privilege, but any holding could not be
worse for its case than First Circuit law.
91. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 804. The court distinguished Spalding from In re Regents of
the University of California, 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The court reasoned that the
licensing agreement at issue in Regents was merely a contract, and communications made in
pursuit of such an agreement do not implicate substantive issues of patent law - the patent




purpose of obtaining a patent, which clearly implicates substantive patent
law.
9 2
B. The Standard for Granting a Writ of Mandamus in the Federal Circuit
The Spalding court then addressed the propriety of mandamus as a remedy
to contest the discovery order." The Federal Circuit employed a strict
standard, stating that a court should grant mandamus "'only when there has
been a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial authority in the grant
or denial of the order."'" The court noted that the petitioner has the burden
of establishing a "'clear and indisputable"' right to issuance of the writ and that
mandamus must be the only means available to obtain the relief sought.95
The opinion observed that the question of whether the attorney-client privilege
applies to invention records was an issue of first impression for the Federal
Circuit.' The Federal Circuit reasoned that an allegation of usurpation of
judicial power coupled with an issue of first impression made mandamus an
appropriate remedy." Finally, the court recognized that it had previously
found a writ of mandamus to be proper "to prevent the wrongful exposure of
privileged communications."'" Applying the standard set forth to the facts of
Spalding, the Federal Circuit found that Spalding Sports had cleared the high
hurdle set for the granting of a writ of mandamus."
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Connaught Labs., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham P.L.C., 165 F.3d 1368,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964). See
generally FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b).
95. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 804 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1387).
96. Id. The specific question was "whether the attorney-client privilege applie[d] to an
invention record submitted for patent evaluation." Id.
97. Id. (citing Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at I ll).
98. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1387).
99. Id. The court found, as explained supra note 90, that the issue was one of first
impression, that Spalding Sports had a clear and indisputable right to relief, and that other
means of obtaining relief were inadequate. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 804-05. The court
explained that mandamus is appropriate to contest an order compelling disclosure over a
claim of privilege "'because maintenance of the attorney-client privilege up to its proper
limits has substantial importance to the administration of justice, and because an appeal after
disclosure of the privileged communication is an inadequate remedy."' Id. at 804 (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1387). The Federal Circuit also explained that "the
immediate resolution of this issue [regarding invention records] will avoid the development
of discovery practices... that might undermine the proper maintenance of the attorney-client
privilege." Id.
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C. The Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege in the Federal Circuit
The court then turned to the question of whether the attorney-client privilege
applied to the invention record."" Spalding focused its argument on the fact
that the inventor prepared the record for the purpose of seeking legal advice
and further emphasized the fact that it sent the document to its corporate legal
department."" Spalding contended that even though the invention record
contained technical information, its purposes were to aid in making an initial
patentability determination and then in preparing a patent application."
Wilson, on the other hand, argued that Spalding had failed to prove that the
purpose of the invention record was to obtain legal advice, rather than
business advice, from the patent committee."'  Alternatively, Wilson
requested disclosure of the technical information contained in the invention
record, such as the list of prior art."'
In the end, the Federal Circuit sided with Spalding. ' In agreeing with the
United States Supreme Court that courts should decide the attorney-client
privilege on a case-by-case basis,"' the Federal Circuit determined that "the
central inquiry is whether the communication is one that was made by a client
to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services. '""" The
Spalding opinion first determined that the document, in fact, was a com-
munication to an attorney, as the inventor submitted it to Spalding's corporate
legal department. "" Next, the court found credible the declaration of
Spalding's in-house patent counsel that, as a matter of policy, the patent
attorneys referred to invention records to make patentability deter-
minations."' Therefore, the court held that invention records are privileged
as long as they are provided to an attorney 'for the purpose of securing




104. Id. Prior art is a list of existing patents that the inventor feels are relevant to
determinations of patentability, i.e., nonobviousness, novelty, usefulness, etc. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103 (2000). Wilson would want to discover what prior patents Spalding Sports
thought were relevant prior art to ensure that Spalding Sports had disclosed all of the prior
art to the PTO. Failure by Spalding Sports to disclose the prior art the inventor had listed
as relevant to the P1O would strengthen Wilson's claim of inequitable conduct. See Crouse,
supra note 73, at 18.
105. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 805.
106. Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981)).







primarily legal opinion, or legal services, or assistance in a legal
proceeding." 
10
The Spalding court then rejected Wilson's argument for disclosure of the
prior art listed on the invention record on the theory that Spalding did not ask
for legal advice."' The court stated, "[W]e do not consider that it is neces-
sary to dissect the document to separately evaluate each of its components. It
is enough that the overall tenor of the document indicates that it is a request
for legal advice or services."" The court also found that the inclusion of
technical information, such as a list of prior art, does not render a document
discoverable because requests for legal advice in the patent arena will
necessarily require an attorney to evaluate technical information."' In sum-
mation, the Federal Circuit observed that
an attorney cannot evaluate patentability or prepare a competent
patent application without knowing the prior art and obtaining
relevant technical information from the inventors. Accordingly,
since Spalding's invention record was prepared and submitted
primarily for the purpose of obtaining legal advice on patentability
and legal services in preparing a patent application, we conclude
that it is privileged in its entirety.""
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit relegated the thirty-year-old Jack Winter
line of cases to a mere footnote.'' The footnote explained that the court was
aware of the cases supporting the "mere conduit" theory."6 Dispensing with
110. Id. (quoting Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 940 (Ct. CI.
1980)). The court recognized that Knogo rejected the "mere conduit" theory. Id. The opinion
also cited Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963), for its proposition that the preparation
and prosecution of patent applications constitutes the practice of law. Spalding, 203 F.3d at
805-06.
Ill. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 806.
112. Id. Importantly, the Spalding court also acknowledged that it is unnecessary
expressly to request confidential legal advice when such a request is implied. Id.
113. Id. (citing Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 941). The court quoted the following
passage from Knogo:
The fact that much of the technical information in one form or another finds its
way into the patent application, to be made public when the patent issues,
should not preclude the assertion of the privilege over the communication in
which that information was disclosed to the attorney. If an attorney-client
communication could be discovered if it contained information known to others,
then it would be the rare communication that would be protected and, in turn,
it would be the rare client who would freely communicate to an attorney.
Id. (quoting Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 941).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 806 n.3.
116. Id. (citing Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
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this line of cases, the court found that those cases did not involve invention
records, were not binding on the Federal Circuit, and concluded that "the
better rule is the one articulated in this case."
' 7
D. The Crime-Fraud Exception to Pierce the Attorney-Client Privilege
Finally, the court decided that the crime-fraud exception did not destroy the
attorney-client privilege.' 6 Spalding asserted that to abrogate the attorney-
client privilege, Wilson must make a prima facie showing of common law
fraud."9 Spalding further argued that an allegation of inequitable conduct
will not destroy the privilege because proving inequitable conduct, unlike
common law fraud, does not require a showing of "clear intent to deceive the
examiner."'2" Spalding also offered that, regardless of the existence of fraud,
the invention record itself was not discoverable because it was not made in the
furtherance of fraud.' Wilson countered by avowing that it had established
a prima facie showing of both common law fraud and inequitable conduct
because the standards were practically identical.'" Wilson also argued that
the district court had properly inferred intent to deceive and that Spalding
made the invention record in furtherance of a fraud on the PTO.'
23
The Federal Circuit rejected Wilson's arguments, emphasizing the clear
distinction between common law fraud and inequitable conduct.'2 The court
stated that the showing of common law fraud needed to pierce the attorney-
client privilege requires a clear demonstration that the parties made com-
munications to further a crime or fraud, while inequitable conduct is a
broader, more inclusive concept." Inequitable conduct, according to the
court, is a lesser offense and can be proven without a showing of knowing
and willful fraud.' 26 Moreover, inequitable conduct, by itself, does not
Howes v. Med. Components, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511, 1512 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 155 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Sneider v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Choat v. Rome Indus., Inc., 462 F.
Supp. 728, 732 (N.D. Ga. 1978)).
117. Id.
118. id. at 807.
119. Id. at 806 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 806-07.
122. Id. at 807.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1169-70
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).




indicate common law fraud.'" The court held that merely failing to cite prior
art will not suffice for a showing of fraud; the withholding must show
fraudulent intent." In light of this reasoning, the Federal Circuit found the
district court's inference of fraudulent intent to be incorrect, as Wilson did not
show that Spalding created the invention record to further a fraud on the
PTO.'"' A mere allegation of a failure to cite a prior art reference to the
PTO would not suffice."' The Federal Circuit observed the fallacy of
Wilson's argument when it stated that if the invention record contained a
reference to art that was not cited to the PTO, any potential fraud was not
committed through the invention record, but by the patent attorney's
subsequent failure to reference the art to the PTO."' Wilson had not
produced any evidence of fraudulent intent, and therefore, the crime-fraud
exception did not apply."
V. Analysis: The Federal Circuit Chose the Proper Path, but Should Have
Gone Farther
The Federal Circuit correctly dismissed the Jack Winter line of cases'
despite the legitimacy in part of Jack Winter's reasoning. Indeed, a patent
applicant should not be able to avoid statutorily required disclosure merely by
funneling information into the hands of an attorney." Furthermore, the
Framers of the Constitution provided patents for the purpose of promoting the
"progress of science and the useful arts."" The new ideas disclosed in the
patent are available to anyone interested and, although protected, certainly
allow scientists and competitors to learn and discover.'" Consequently,
patent applications should contain all relevant information on how to make
and best use the invention to afford the greatest benefit to society.'3' Indeed,
the fatal flaw of the Jack Winter case lies in its total underestimation of the
job patent attorneys perform. As the Knogo court noted:
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071).




133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that tax records do
not become privileged simply because a party has funneled them into the hands of an
attorney).
135. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 8.
136. See Go, supra note 14, at 613.
137. See supra note 26.
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The conclusion reached by the authorities in the Jack Winter
camp rests on an oversimplification of the role performed by the
patent attorney during the patent application process. . . .[The
attorney] does not file his client's communications with the Patent
Office. He does not file transcripts of his conversations with the
client regarding technical matters and then await the issuance of a
patent, yet this is the impression one derives from a reading of the
Jack Winter view."
The reality of the cooperative effort put forth by the inventor and the patent
attorney is far different from the Jack Winter portrayal.'" The Knogo
characterization of the relationship is far more accurate; therefore, the Federal
Circuit correctly adopted the Knogo view over Jack Winter. Furthermore,
although still recognized, many courts had already begun to reject the Jack
Winter line of cases. " In the last decade, the great weight of authority has
held that the privilege should attach to some technical communications."'
The strength of the Spalding opinion lies in the Federal Circuit's decision
not to attempt to separate technical information from requests for legal advice
in the invention records." As stated in Knogo, the technical information and
requests for legal advice are often inseparable and at least hopelessly
intertwined."3 However, the Federal Circuit opinion in Spalding fell short
for two major reasons. First, by relegating Jack Winter and the "mere conduit"
theory to a footnote, and especially by failing to examine and reject the
relevant holdings of this line of cases, the Federal Circuit left the door open
for a ruling that the privilege might not protect some technical com-
munications.'" This will likely lead to continued confusion over the
application of the privilege to many client-patent attorney communications,
excluding invention records. Second, the Federal Circuit erred by not adopting
the Advanced Cardiovascular theory that all communications between' client
138. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
139. Id. at 940-41.
140. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372, 375 (N.D.
Cal. 1992).
141. Id.
142. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
143. Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 941.
144. See Spalding, 203 F.3d at 806 n.3; see also Michael 0. Sutton & Christopher G.
Darrow, Recent Developments in Patent Law, 9 TEx. INrELL. PROP. L.J. 429, 446 (2001)





and patent attorney, even those that are entirely technical, are presumptively
privileged.4"
A. Spalding's Failure to Address and Reject Jack Winter
1. Spalding Does Not Rule Out Forced Production of a Privileged
Document
Even after Spalding, a likelihood exists that a court could force production
of a purely or even mostly technical document that a client transmits to his
attorney.' This presents almost innumerable difficulties. One obvious utility
of a patent infringement lawsuit is to use the suit as an excuse to discover
everything the opponent is pursuing as far as obtaining patents. Any
willingness by a court to force production of technical information will only
further this improper and unethical practice' 7 and encourage frivolous patent
infringement suits.'" The arrangement of technical data communicated to a
patent attorney, especially coupled with comparisons to data from existing
patents, can reveal information about the client's invention process that a
competitor could not narrowly ascertain from test result data. Indeed, the
process a client uses to invent is highly confidential in many cases. Further
problems could arise if a client chooses to redact portions of a technical com-
munication the court has ordered the client to turn over. In many cases, the
client could truthfully argue that the redacted portions relate to different
inventions or patents not at issue in the dispute. The Spalding court's failure
to address the reasoning of the Jack Winter line of cases did nothing to ease
such concerns.
2. The Two Flaws of Jack Winter Not Specifically Addressed
in Spalding
The Jack Winter line of cases has two shortcomings. First, Jack Winter did
not differentiate between communications and facts. Second, it failed to
understand the PTO disclosure requirements. First, it is absolutely critical to
note that communications - not the underlying facts, data, or information -
receive the benefit of attorney-client privilege. 49 This is the exact distinction
that the Jack Winter line failed to make and it is a flaw that Spalding did not
145. See Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 378.
146. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
147. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides sanctions for abusive
discovery practices. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
148. Plain logic dictates that a plaintiff is far more likely to bring an infringement suit
if it knows, win or lose, it has a good chance of discovering valuable technical information
from a competitor.
149. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 374.
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address or specifically reject. Jack Winter and its progeny became narrow-
minded in their efforts to ensure availability of "technical information such as
the results of research, tests and experiments."'" However, a party seeking
discovery already is free to ask the inventor for whatever information is likely
to lead to discovery of admissible evidence."' Thus, opposing parties can
discover, directly from the inventor, the technical information the inventor had
about the invention, the results of tests the inventor performed, the documents
related to experiments with the invention, and everything the inventor knew
about prior art."2 A proper application of the privilege, however, simply
blocks an indirect method of obtaining this technical information by accessing
private attorney-client communications." 3 Rather than use the lazy approach
of discovering what the opponent thought was technically important enough
to pass on to the attorney, the court should force the party seeking discovery
to ask for the proper information." Spalding does little to encourage
appropriate discovery practices.
Jack Winter and its progeny held that the full scope of the privilege do not
apply to patent applications because the courts viewed the application process
as having a much more extensive disclosure requirement than normal
litigation.' This is the second major flaw of the Jack Winter line of cases
that the Federal Circuit failed to address and reject. The attorney-client
privilege exists
to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client .... "The lawyer-client privilege rests
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates
150. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon, 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977).
151. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
152. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 374.
153. See id.
154. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 390 (D.D.C. 1978) ("If an
attorney-client communication could be discovered if it contained information known to
others, then it would be the rare communication that would be protected and, in turn, it
would be the rare client who would freely communicate to an attorney.").
155. See supra Part III.A; see also Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225,
228 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (noting that the PTO is different from the normal adversary; before the
normal adversary, parties are at liberty to "lay back" somewhat, but before the PTO, total
disclosure is required). But see Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 377-78 (holding that
comparable duties of disclosure and good faith exist in civil litigation, while recognizing




to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional
mission is to be carried out."' 6
The failure of Spalding categorically to protect all confidential com-
munications will prevent full and frank communication between patent
attorney and client.
Spalding would have better served the patent bar by examining the
relationship between the attorney-client privilege and the extensive disclosure
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § I 12.'sT Undoubtedly, full disclosure to the PTO
of all information material to patentability is a mandatory and beneficial
requirement."' The attorney, however, has no duty to transmit information
that is not material to patentability. 5 ' He is not a "mere conduit" for every
line of technical data relating to an invention. The duties to disclose, "while
real and substantial, are not boundless.'" ' Indeed, the duty of full disclosure
does not require the applicant to list the "full spectrum of his knowledge" to
establish the metes and bounds of the patent.' 6' In fact, "[i]nventors and their
patent lawyers can be expected to have, in complete good faith, substantial
private dialogue aimed at determining which of a wide range of possible
information is in fact 'material' and thus subject to the duty to disclose." 2
After all, "'[m]ateriality' is by no means a self-defining concept, especially
when the subject of the patent is complex or subtle.""'3 The fact that much
of the technical information a client communicates to his patent attorney
eventually makes its way into the patent application should not preclude the
assertion of the attorney-client privilege to protect the communication that
disclosed such information to the attorney.1"
When the applicant signs and swears to 'an application that is filed, the
applicant obviously does not intend that communication to remain confiden-
tial; however, the same cannot be said about the technical communications
that lead up to the application." The Spalding court should have examined
more fully and rejected the Jack Winter notion that the attorney must relay to
156. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
157. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
158. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2000).
159. See id,
160. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 378.
161. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir.
1972).
162. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 378.
163. Id.
164. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 941 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
165. Id.
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the PTO every iota of information the client communicates in relation to a
potential patent.
3. The Federal Circuit Leaves the Door Open for Continued Confusion
Spalding still might allow for the seemingly overbroad - but previously
permissible, under Jack Winter - discovery request for all technical
information communicated to the patent attorney. The party opposing
discovery still has the burden of proving that the client submitted the infor-
mation for the purpose of obtaining legal advice."M There is, however, no
need for patent practitioners to become alarmed. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
leniently found a legal-advice purpose based on the fact that (1) the client sent
the invention record to its in-house legal department and (2) an in-house
patent attorney declared that he used the record in making patentability
determinations. 7 Despite the Federal Circuit's leniency, the fact remains that
some courts might not be so merciful."
According to a current treatise, the party seeking to avoid discovery "must
make a reasonably clear showing that documents containing technical matters
communicated in confidence are primarily of a legal nature and involve the
rendition of legal service."'"T  This requirement likely stems from an
interpretation of Spalding's legal-advice requirement. Spalding's apparent
requirement of a reasonably clear showing that the communication sought
legal advice is unnecessary, ambiguous, and problematic.
Implicit in the legal-advice requirement is the belief that patent attorneys are
somehow involved in the client's business decisions or technical concerns.
Certainly, business concerns play a role in some decisions made during the
patenting process. However, it is safe to assume that the client or inventor, not
the patent attorney, "pulls the lead oar in identifying and ascribing weight to
such considerations."'71 The client pays the patent attorney to predict how
166. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(defining the central inquiry as whether the client made the communication for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice or services). The party asserting the attorney-client privilege has
the burden of proving each requisite element. See, e.g., Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States,
60 F.R.D. 177, 184 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
167. See Spalding, 203 F.3d at 805.
168. Although the Federal Circuit sets binding precedent for patent law issues, it is not
difficult to envision a district court deciding that whether a communication sought legal
advice is not a substantive patent law issue and, therefore, applying its own, stricter test. This
is possible because the Federal Circuit applies its law only to substantive patent issues. Id.
at 803. The law of the circuit where the case originated governs all other issues. Id.
169. 26 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 60:1032 (2002).





a patent examiner will likely reason about quasi-legal concepts, like obvious-
ness,'17 not primarily to give advice about business or technical matters.'"
Furthermore, the PTO requires a technical education background" to
become a patent attorney or agent, so one might hypothesize that very few
patent attorneys possess the requisite business education to give credible
business advice. A patent attorney will more likely use technical data to make
patentability evaluations and make "materiality""4 assessments than to offer
technical advice on how to make an invention.'"
By insisting on proof that the client submitted the data to the patent attorney
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the Spalding court invites testimony
that is "unreliable at best, and an invitation for false swearing at worst.'
76
Indeed, the Federal Circuit left open the possibility that some technical
communications will be exposed.
B. The Federal Circuit Should Have Adopted the Clearer Standard of
Advanced Cardiovascular
Every concern raised above would have been erased had the Spalding court
adopted the rule expressed in Advanced Cardiovascular that all com-
munications between client and patent attorney, even those that are entirely
technical, are presumptively privileged.' " In doing so, the court would have
eased any worries about the continuing existence of Jack Winter and its
progeny and would have eliminated the complications involved in proving that
the communication sought legal advice. Unless a client transmits technical
information to the patent attorney and the patent attorney reproduces the
information, without editing, in the patent application, a presumption of
privilege is proper."8 Why else would a client submit technical information
to a patent attorney except for the purpose of obtaining legal advice? As
shown above, courts have already correctly found that the client takes the lead
in making business and technical decisions." The inventor looks to the
171. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
172. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 377.
173. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR
ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 3-4, available at http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/dcomolia/oed/grbO2O4.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
174. See Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 377.
175. For instance, the client could hire a technical consultant far more cheaply than
engaging a patent attorney to work in the actual invention process.
176. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 941 (Ct. CI. 1980).
177. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 378.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
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lawyer to understand the procedural and substantive legal requirements (e.g.,
the scope and character of the duty of disclosure) for issuance of the patent,
as well as the criteria the law recognizes as relevant in possible future enforce-
ment and validity actions." '
Advanced Cardiovascular is a well-reasoned opinion. In Advanced
Cardiovascular, Magistrate Judge Brazil of the Northern District of California
effectively overruled his own earlier opinion. He admitted that a prior
decision'81 that followed Jack Winter "reflected no awareness that there
was ... a clear division of authority on [the issue of attorney-client privilege
in patent litigation]" and that he was "[a]pparently ignorant" of the Knogo line
of cases." Calling the Knogo line "well-reasoned," the court adopted the
Knogo view after "consider[ing] the matter in greater depth, and having read
all the relevant cases [it] could find."'83
The Advanced Cardiovascular court then painstakingly examined every
aspect of the relationship between patent attorney and client as a "hopefully
maturing perception of the realties of the patent application process" came to
fruition.' The court determined that the decisions made in pursuing a patent
are "not simple, linear, technical undertakings. They are intellectually dense,
and the density is both technical and legal."'" The court rejected both the
idea that the pursuit of the patent attorney was a business concern and that
the client had no expectation of confidentiality due to the extensive PTO
disclosure requirements."7
The Advanced Cardiovascular court concluded that it was reasonable for a
client to expect that the substantial private dialogue that takes place in the
shaping and focusing of a patent application will remain confidential."' The
court therefore held that even purely technical communications are
presumptively privileged, and that it would consider ordering disclosure of
such communications "only on a very compelling showing . . . that ... the
inventor . . . expected specific communications he or she made to patent
counsel to be disclosed, without editing, to the PTO."''
180. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 376-77.
181. See Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 533, 542 (N.D. Cal
1987).
182. Advanced Cardiovascular, 144 F.R.D. at 374.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 375.
185. Id. at 376.
186. Id. at 377.
187. Id.





Other courts have followed suit."' In finding Advanced Cardiovascular's
later views on attorney-client privilege persuasive, Judge Sippel remarked:
In fact, inventors and their patent counsel often engage in quite
substantive private dialogue as part of the process of shaping and
focusing a patent application and like any other attorney client
relationship it is reasonable for them to expect their dialogue to
remain confidential. On that basis such communication is
presumptively protected by the attorney-client privilege. This
analysis extends even to the organization of technical information.
To find otherwise is to oversimplify the patent application process
and to demean the patent attorney's role to that of a mere
scrivener."'
The reader should note that the above quotation distinguishes between the
technical data itself, which the privilege does not protect, and the organization
or arrangement of data present in a communication, which the privilege does
protect. The strength of Knogo's and Advanced Cardiovascular's tests are that
they seek "to examine documents in light of the relationship between patent
attorney and client within the application process, rather than just examining
a document in isolation from that process."'" The tests would still grant the
privilege to a highly technical document as long as the communication was
confidential and requested legal advice.
Patent attorneys and their clients would have benefitted greatly had the
Federal Circuit adopted the presumption of privilege from Advanced
Cardiovascular.' Adopting a presumption of privilege would enable district
courts to force parties seeking discovery to use some professionalism in asking
for specific technical information from their opponents, rather than allowing
them to trample the attorney-client privilege by requesting all general technical
information communicated to an attorney with respect to the patent at issue.
Furthermore, it would have conclusively extinguished the Jack Winter line of
cases. Instead, patent attorneys must continue to approach client com-
munications with uncertainty.
190. See, e.g., Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Messagephone, Inc. v. SVI Sys., Inc., NO. 3-97-1813 H, 1998
WL 812397 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1998); Ryobi N. Am., Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 7 F. Supp.
2d 1019, 1021 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 827 F. Supp. 1242
(E.D. La. 1993); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 815 F. Supp. 793 (D. Del. 1993).
191. Ryobi, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
192. Laitram, 827 F. Supp. at 1246.
193. See Go, supra note 14, at 648 (proposing that the Federal Circuit adopt the
"enlightened" position of Advanced Cardiovascular).
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VI. What Communications Are Privileged in Light of Spalding?
Spalding generates two obvious questions: (1) what communications are
privileged? and (2) what can practitioners do to protect the privilege? Several
courts recently have interpreted Spalding.' McCook Metals v. Alcoa,
Inc.'" examined Spalding less than a month after the Federal Circuit handed
down the opinion" and exemplifies the confusion Spalding left in its wake.
The McCook Metals court held that while draft patent applications are
privileged, technical communications made in pursuit of such an application
are not." This holding is at odds with reality because courts had already
noted that technical information plays a part in the "quite substantive" private
dialogue that takes place between client and patent attorney.'"
A client should not have to worry about arranging technical data in a
nonrevealing manner before communicating it to the attorney. The holding of
McCook Metals is inexplicable in light of the fact that, while not all technical
data communicated to the patent attorney will make its way into a publicly
accessible patent application file, all of the information in a patent application
communicated to the PTO will be publicly available. Therefore, the client has
a more reasonable expectation of confidentiality with respect to technical data
transmitted to the attorney to prepare an application than with the actual draft
of the application; yet the draft is privileged and the communications are not.
One could infer that the McCook Metals court stumbled over the distinction
between communications and the facts present in the communication. The
communication is privileged but the facts are not. Spalding could have
eliminated this problem by adopting the Advanced Cardiovascular theory that
all communications, even purely technical communications, are presumptively
privileged.
The McCook Metals court ruled on the application of privilege to a variety
of documents, including draft patent applications (privileged), a form reminder
of the duty of disclosure to the PTO (privileged), a checklist noting that the
attorney reviewed issues and patent requirements with the client (privileged),
194. Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 108
(D. Mass. 2001) (granting privilege to technical documents); Softview Computer Prods. Corp.
v. Haworth, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that privilege is not
automatically eliminated because a communication contains technical data, as long as the
client intended the communication to be confidential); Transonic Sys., Inc. v. Non-Invasive
Med. Tech., 192 F.R.D. 710 (D. Utah 2000) (following Spalding).
195. 192 F.R.D. 242 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
196. See id.
197. Id. at 252.




summary of competitor patents (not privileged), interoffice memoranda
containing sales data, royalties, etc. (not privileged, but with any legal
opinions therein redacted), Invention Control Sheet and Report (privileged,
equivalent to Spalding invention record), and technical drawings, sketches,
tables, and test results sent from inventor to patent attorney (not
privileged). ' Interestingly, while the court held that the attorney-client
privilege did not protect technical drawings and descriptions, the privilege did
protect the Invention Control Sheet and Report containing a "detailed technical
description of the invention and testing results.""2 "x The McCook Metals court
reached this result because it recognized an implicit request for legal advice
in the Invention Control Sheet and Report but not in the technical com-
munications."" The McCook Metals court reasoned that the Invention
Control Sheet, containing technical data, implicitly requests that the patent
attorney form a legal opinion and render services, yet the technical data by
itself does not contain an explicit or implied request for legal advice." It is
difficult to imagine how the court could make this differentiation and what the
court thinks the patent attorney does with the technical data other than use it
to form a legal opinion. In Spalding, the Federal Circuit noted that an attorney
cannot evaluate patentability or prepare a competent patent application without
obtaining technical data from the inventors."1 It seems, although it is not
plainly apparent, that the Federal Circuit intended the attorney-client privilege
to include technical data communicated to aid in preparing an application.
Again, an adoption of a presumptive privilege by the Federal Circuit would
avoid McCook Metals's inconsistent results.
Six months after McCook Metals, the same district court, in SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., rejected an invitation to limit Spalding
only to invention records."1 The court found several documents privileged,
including "'reports of technical information or results of tests requested by
attorneys . . . said to involve assessments of patentability, or provide
information underlying legal advice for the protection of patents . . . and
described as prepared in order to allow attorneys to assess patentability and
199. McCook Metals, 192 F.R.D. at 252-55.
200. Id. at 254.
201. Id. at 254-55.
202. Id.
203. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
204. NO. 98 C 3952, 2000 WL 1310668 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2000).
205. Id. at *5. But see Fordham v. Onesoft Corp., NO. CIV. A. 00-1078-A, 2000 WL
33341416 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2000) (limiting Spalding to invention records and allowing
discovery of confidential draft patent applications). Spalding could have avoided such
inconsistent decisions by adopting a presumptive privilege to all communications between
patent attorney and client.
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sift information to prepare applications."'" It is apparent that, after Spalding,
to ensure that technical data is privileged, it should be accompanied by an
explicit request for legal advice or in direct response to a request for legal
advice.
A post-Spalding article suggests that in order to ensure the attorney-client
privilege, a client should clearly label invention disclosure records, which
include technical data, as privileged and specify that the client is providing the
information for the purposes of securing legal opinions, services, or legal
assistance.'" Further, the client should always submit the information
directly to the attorney,' and the evaluators of the invention disclosure
record should always focus on patentability or related legal issues over
business issues involving competitors or market penetration.' Another
treatise suggests doing away with the traditional boilerplate confidentiality
statement many lawyers now place on every communication.2" Instead, the
author suggests two reasons for using such a disclaimer only when confiden-
tiality is truly intended. First, it will actually alert the attorney and recipient
of the communication of the sensitive nature of the document."' Second, the
attorney can point to a clear intention of confidentiality because the language
is not part of a boilerplate communication scheme."' Although Spalding
certainly made it easier for technical documents to retain the attorney-client
privilege, the practitioner still takes a risk when receiving or transmitting
purely technical data. Taking precautions similar to those listed above may
serve to lessen that risk.
VII. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit correctly rejected the faltering Jack Winter line of cases
and followed Knogo. However, the decision to brush aside Jack Winter in a
footnote with limited explanation instead of specifically addressing its flaws
was shortsighted. The failure to abandon expressly the entire line of cases
following Jack Winter was even more shortsighted. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
set itself up to confront cases in the future by not ruling that all technical
communications are presumptively privileged. Requiring proof that the client
transmitted the information for the purpose of obtaining legal advice will
206. SmithKline Beecham, 2000 WL 1310668, at *4 (quoting Smithkline Beecham Corp.
v. Apotex Corp., 193 F.R.D. 530, 538 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
207. See Crouse, supra note 73, at 18.
208. Id.
209. Id.






create additional difficulties. As a result, patent attorneys and clients must still
exercise caution when exchanging technical information. The proper rule
would presumptively protect all communications unless the party urging
disclosure made a compelling showing that the inventor intended the attorney
to disclose the information, without editing, to the public through a patent
application. Such a rule would encourage full and candid disclosure between
patent attorney and client, which is, of course, the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege.
Matthew R. Rodgers
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